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2Forward
The Nuffield experience has been fascinating, testing and exciting. It has
given me opportunities to engage in things I never thought I would have
opportunity to do, and to visit places and meet people in the pursuit of my
study. My ideas and understanding of the issues relating to agroterrorism
have shifted since I began this study. At the start I saw it as an issue which
could be met by a ‘simple’ process response. Now I now see a need not only
to plan and prepare for such eventualities but a greater need and
understanding for the requirement of rural emergency planning in general. In
addition the need to educate and communicate is very much at the core of my
thoughts on this difficult issue. I also saw it very much as an international
issue but it is clear now the threat from perpetrators comes not just from
overseas but from within our own borders and from many political, ideological
and even criminal standpoints.
It is easy to get lost in the rhetoric of politicised musings regarding the threat
of terrorism. However, at when considering protection of the at the most
‘basic’ level – the family and the family business it is clear it is incumbent on
all of us to take a degree of responsibility for the protection of our own
resources as well as government. Agroterrorism is an issue, which needs to
be taken ownership of. Whilst governments can legislate, advise and plan at
the national level, only the industry truly understands the complexity of the
agricultural economic system and as such is best placed to provide the
solutions and to a large degree the actions required. From my experience in
the US, industry based solutions within a soft governmental advisory
framework appear to provide the robustness and security for most elements of
the agricultural economy. The role of government is to provide the greater
protective fabric and to assist in the mobilisation and co-ordination of
resources. Emergency planning in this area is not so much about victim
assistance but about community resilience.
At present in the UK this situation does not exist. Agroterrorism has become
lost amongst the wider discussion of food security and usually (due to its
complexity) has been pushed down the agenda in favour of discussions
regarding food imports and the level of UK production. For a nation with a
declining capacity to produce food and a growing population the need to
maintain food security is increasing and therefore any issue that could
dramatically alter the balance of food availability in a relatively short space of
time needs proper clear and unambiguous consideration. Currently it would
appear that agroterrorism is viewed as a food supply issue which through the
use of imports any immediate impact could be alleviated. This approach,
however, does little to address the economic and social issues resultant from
any form of attack on UK agriculture as well as the long term health and well-
being of the national agricultural system.
With this in mind it might be pertinent to adopt some of the methods currently
in use in the US where their experience of planning for large scale natural
disasters – hurricanes, tornados, forest fires etc has embodied the need to
plan for extreme eventualities into the farm system. Adopting a ‘resilience’
stance may mean the difference between containment or loss of control of an
3incident – the watchwords may therefore be ‘forewarned is forearmed1’ and
the key to this is to provide accurate, focussed information to the industry from
which they can develop a response.
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51.0 Introduction
I don’t come from a farming family (unless you count my paternal grandfather
who farmed in Ireland many years ago) and I grew up in a small south
Cheshire town, not totally removed from rurality, and unlike most Nuffield
scholars I was pretty removed from agriculture until became an
undergraduate. I studied environmental science at university, progressing
onto a masters in development agriculture and finally a PhD in rural
geography. I spent my formative academic years in various university
geography departments and in 2000 moved to Harper Adams University
College where I am today. My principal research interests are in factors,
which affect agricultural production – farm and rural crime being my main
area. It was from this I developed an interest in agroterrorism, its potential use
and impact. I did not come to this totally cold. In my past I had served as an
observer in the Royal Observer Corps which was in the Cold War a civil
defence agency allied to the Royal Air Force primarily responsible for the
detection and monitoring of radiation. The ROC was officially disbanded in
1995 – an outcome of the end of the cold war. A period adrift ended when I
joined the reserves in 2004 this time switching light blue for the dark blue of
the Royal Navy. It is with the RN my interests in security and infrastructure
has been greatly developed. Although a short time with the RN, it has been
active. A short tour in the Southern Gulf in 2006 paved the way to moving to a
specialist tri-service unit – the Military Stabilisation Support Group whom I
deployed with as part of 3 Commando Brigade to Helmand, Afghanistan in
September 2008. Very much this combination of military (in particular security
training and awareness), academic interest and working within the rural and
agricultural community has aided me in engaging with the issue of
agroterrorism.
I first became aware of agroterrorism through a BBC wire report in 2004
where the outgoing US health secretary Tommy Thompson declared ‘ I for the
life of me cannot understand why the terrorists have not attacked our food
supply, because its so easy to do’. His comments were initially greeted with
scepticism (on both side of the Atlantic) with more commentators seeking to
disprove his disprove his statement than prove it. Many sought to categorise
his statements as post 9/11 hype and US over reaction – looking for issues
where no issue lay.
However, whilst many decried Thompson’s assertions other commentators
pointed out quite correctly that the US itself had for many years sought the
capability to destroy and disrupt other nation’s food supply as part of the cold
war effort. It was therefore not unreasonable if superpowers had thought it a
viable way of damaging an enemy that others might also consider it a
possibility, in particular the non state actors –terrorists. As a not indirect result
of Thompson’s public comments the recognition of the vulnerability of the food
production sector to outside influence, within government, law agencies and
the food sector has slowly grown in the US. Indeed since 1999 the US
congress has held five hearings specifically devoted to agro-terrorism or
agricultural biosecurity. Initially these hearings were militarily focussed, after
9/11 the focus shifted to terrorist groups adopting the tactic. The fact that the
US Congress has invested time and more importantly effort in gathering
6information on this issue says something for the profile of this threat in the US.
This is not a concern which is the preserve of radical survivalist organisations,
doomsday enthusiasts or a dominated by one political party. Within the US
and indeed Canada and Australia it is a recognised threat – one of many
governments and industry are made aware of and seek to plan for.
Agroterrorism has many definitions, but for the purpose of this study I shall
adopt that of Jim Monke an agricultural policy researcher of the Congressional
Research Service. Monke is one of the most established researchers in this
field and as such is well known as a source of credible and respected
published information. Monke defines agroterrorism as ;
‘The deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease with the goal
of generating fear over the safety of food, causing economic losses
and/ or undermining social stability’2
It is interesting to note Monke does not see it as a way of killing or maiming
vast numbers of people – although with some Zoonotic diseases this clearly is
a possibility. Current opinion that agroterrorism presents the greatest threat to
society as an economic impact weapon. As a vector for attacking a population
with disease bioterrorism has many more efficient vectors of disease
distribution than those offered by agriculture e.g. infecting people with a virus
on a tube train. However, affecting a population’s health cannot be ruled out.
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71.1 Background
In 2006 I explored the potential of an agroterrorist attack on the UK’s
agriculture through a paper published in the International Journal of Rural
Crime. This piece of work was incomplete in the sense that whilst it
considered causes and outcomes it didn’t explore the nature of the threat or
the process of response. It was this aspect which I felt required attention if
any scenario construction was to be placed into context – little point in
hypothesising if there is no evaluation of responses. This interest coincided
with an increase in policy and information available in the US regarding
agroterrorism, which contrasted totally with the situation in the UK. Indeed a
search of relevant UK agencies revealed no public mention of agroterrorism –
indeed contact with such agencies either drew blank, denials of any issue or
dismissal. This was in direct contrast to the US, which at this time was openly
discussing agroterrorism, producing policies and most intriguingly funding
public agencies, law enforcement and training in this area. UK commentators
appeared to brush off these developments as solely a US fear. However,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand also at this time raised the issue of
agroterrorism and biosecurity. Indeed attending a Rural Crime Conference in
Australia in late 2006 agroterrorism, biosecurity and the potential threat to the
Australian sheep industry was a lively and seriously debated topic.
1.2 Study Objectives
Applying for a Nuffield Scholarship was the best way I could achieve my aim
of exploring the issues surrounding agroterrorism. The US seemed the natural
place to visit. This vast nation hosts ample examples of agricultural production
and allied business as well as an established set of policies relating to
agroterrorism.
Within the US the Department for Homeland Security (DHS) takes the lead
and actively invests in research programmes relating to ‘Agrodefence’ in
conjunction with the US Department of Agriculture. Additionally there is a
Federal strategy relating to agroterrorism, which adopts a multi-agency
approach to the prevention, detection and mitigation of such incidents. This
allows a variety of interpretations and approaches to preparing for incidents to
have been developed as each state has developed response plans under the
federal umbrella which reflect local state agricultural conditions and
requirements. Additionally the Federal Bureau of Investigation have an active
focus on this area, and cascade down security information through state
homeland security departments and agriculture departments to county and
ultimately farm level.
I wanted to find out about the nature of the perceived threat and most
importantly what could be done to mitigate against any eventuality, particularly
at the farm level. I wanted to see what was being developed in terms of policy
and training and I wanted to talk to those involved in these developments to
establish where they considered the challenges were and how the industry
could be involved in the protection process. Clearly from reviewing publicly
available information sourced in the US, communication was important across
8the whole sector and I wanted to explore the nature and form of that
information.
1.3 Project Outline
In order to meet my project’s aims I travelled to the agricultural heartland of
the eastern United States- Georgia. From here I travelled to Washington DC
to meet with key agencies and agricultural bodies. Returning to Atlanta,
Georgia via VirginiaI I went on a road trip (by Greyhound) across Georgia, to
Alabama and Florida. The information and perceptions gathered during this
period was used to contextualise the UK situation and consider the threat and
the UK’s degree of preparedness for an agroterrorism incident.
2.0 The Origins of Agroterrorism
Of all the acts of ‘terrorism’, agroterrorism is one of the least studied and till
recently little considered by contingency planners. Many nation states
including the US, Russia, UK and France had all invested in a variety of
biological agents in the 20th century. Deploying these bioweapons against
agriculture had though been for most nation-states a theoretical consideration.
In the early 1990s the threat from biological attack came to be accepted by
many policy makers, (particularly in the US) as the probable form of terrorist
attack on the human population. Although there was little physical evidence to
support this, beyond some past localised use by radicals. This concern at the
threat of biological attack agents grew in the 1990s and included the concern
that anti-livestock, anticrop and antisoil agents could fall into the hands of
non-state aggressors3.
Initial concern with agroterrorism began in the US where focus lay with firmly
with biological agents including crop diseases, pests and animal diseases.
The use of the latter raises further issues, as some may be transmittable to
humans (Zoonotic). Whilst there are hundreds of potential pathogens,
realistically only a few dozen are considered viable. When considering viability
of an agent, livestock are considered to be more widely susceptible than
crops to pathogens, principally because, livestock in industrialised countries –
the UK, US, Australia, etc are generally considered disease free. They
therefore make effective vectors of transmission, particularly, during live
animal movements.
Anti-terrorism policy development in the US considered agroterrorism in very
narrow context, Parker (2002)4, (as part of the Federal Strategy) described
the risk specifically as being ‘agricultural bioterrorism’. The biological stance
was further reinforced by studies such as Kosel and Anderson (2004)5 who
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9considered the vulnerability of feed stocks in US agriculture and more recently
Ungerer and Rogers (2005)6 who assessed the vulnerability of Australian
agriculture within the context of the introduction of disease.
2.1 The Present Terrorist Threat and Agroterrorism?
Recent British assessments of the terrorist situation both global and UK
indicates a changing and expanding picture. Al-Queda is clearly committed to
continuing to committing attacks, and as the conflict in Afghanistan continues
the situation globally can only become more complex and dangerous meaning
that the UK is now seen as a key target for Al-Queda7. The nature of the
threat may also be seen to be changing, with the threat now including
chemicals, bacteriological agents, radioactive materials and nuclear
technology. Numerous assessments have indicated that Al-Queda is actively
seeking these materials and knowledge relating to chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weaponry 8.
The potential for the use of CBRN materials with the ability to cause
widespread economic disruption and are now seen as being very much part of
the terrorist’s portfolio.
In addition to the international terrorist actors there is an increasing militancy
amongst environmental protestors as seen in actions taken against UK
laboratories and allied companies. In addition there is the omnipresent threat
from criminal organisations. Increasing profits – particularly from supermarket
chains clearly makes the entire food sector and appealing sector for extortion
attempts based around food safety concerns.
2.2 Should Agroterrorism be of Concern to the UK?
The UK’s rural economy is diverse. There are distinct areas of agricultural
production for example the south and eastern parts of the UK are largely
cereal areas, the north, west and uplands of the UK are mostly livestock with
the central part of the country a mixed farming economy and horticulture. UK
farm production accounts for some 60% of all the raw food consumed in the
country and some 73.3% of all indigenous food types eg potatoes. The risk to
both supply of goods and the agri-food economy from tampering is acute.
Additionally, the UK rural economy is highly diversified. For many years British
farmers have been encouraged to diversify in the face of declining markets
and Common Agricultural Policy reform. This has resulted in a high levels of
farm diversification with approximately 46% of full-time farms engaged in
some alternative enterprise and half of these gaining at least 25% of their total
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income from that diversification9. Additionally, outside of agriculture there are
many high value businesses such as hotels, recreation activities, tourism
facilities, golf courses, racecourses and racehorse-training yards interspersed
across the countryside.
Experience of the Foot and Mouth (FMD) in the UK in 2001 provides an
insight in the potential costs to the countryside of an agroterrorist incident.
During the period February 2001 to January 2002 when the last county was
declared disease free, agricultural production lost some £355 million
(approximately 20% of annual farming income). During the outbreak some 4m
animals were slaughtered casting blight over the countryside as their
carcasses were disposed of through mass burial or burning. The countryside
was effectively closed down with the result that tourism and associated
businesses lost between £2.7 and £3.2 billion10. Whilst not all the tourism
losses were in the countryside many foreign visitors were put off visiting the
UK because of the FMD outbreak, particularly over the lucrative summer
months. During this period access to much of the countryside and the
National Parks was restricted or prohibited. This also resulted in many rural
sporting events and activities being restricted or suspended. The horse racing
industry was particularly badly hit with many high profile events cancelled for
example the cancellation of the 2001 Cheltenham festival resulted in the loss
of £4.5m in ticket sales alone and upwards in £7.2m to the wider regional
economy in hospitality etc. The resultant social cost was also high with
businesses closing and redundancies damaging the viability of rural
communities.
3.0 Preparation and Planning for Agroterrorism – The US Approach
I began my exploration of the US’s planning and preparation for a possible
agroterrorism attack in the US State of Georgia. Georgia has one of the
largest and most diverse rural based economies with sizeable sectors in
cereals, livestock, horticulture, peanuts and fruit. It also has a large and varied
diversified sector with a great emphasis on outdoor recreation (particularly)
golf, which would be threatened by any agroterrorism incident.
My introduction to the both the US and Georgia system was facilitated by the
British Consulate based in Atlanta, Georgia, which has amongst its
responsibilities co-ordination of anti-terrorism work.
Initial meetings were held with staff11 of the State of Georgia Agriculture
Department and the Georgia Office of Homeland Security (OHS)12.
Agroterrorism is seen very much as a real issue to agricultural authorities not
just in the State of Georgia but in the other principal agricultural states as well.
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They have all invested a great deal of money in staff, training and facilities to
develop response plans. Politically and economically this is seen as a sound
investment. It was considered that there was a genuine potential threat to
agriculture from a variety of sources not just the actions of international
terrorists. These included disgruntled employees, those acting against large
corporations (many of Georgia’s producers are linked to iconic foodstuffs such
as McDonalds and KFC) and criminal extortionists – both seeking financial
gain directly and being rewarded third party for de-stabilising a rival.
Vulnerability to attack by whatever means was seen as not just as a farm
based threat although feed lots and ranches figured highly in risk, but the
threat was also seen as being to input supply chains as well as outputs
through stock marts. Also contributing to the risk were the state fairs and the
many hobby farms around the state. Wildlife was also seen as a possible
vector for the spread of any contamination across the state.
Biosecurity was seen as a key issue within the State. Georgia hosts the
National Biosecurity Resource Centre which is a research led facility engaging
in animal health research and the security of this facility is considered
paramount. For the wider industry there are a variety of means of
communication as is common to most Department’s of Agriculture. Georgia
promotes a multiplicity of information for agriculturists, hobbyists and horse
keepers on biosecurity. Primary detection of illegal food imports etc at ports
and points of entry is the responsibility of Federal agencies with whom they
engage. As common in most agricultural economies there are great
differences in uptake of biosecurity advice. As would be expected the poultry
and pig sectors are highly biosecurity focussed and aware. Much of this has
been driven by the processing industry and their assurance requirements. At
the lower level of production, the picture is more fragmented with varying
implementation of biosecurity arrangements.
3.1 The US State and Federal System and Agroterrorism
Preparedness
The Georgia OHS and the Georgia Department of Agriculture work within a
wider Federal Government framework. The Federal system works directly
under the President and is the co-ordinated by three Federal agencies – the
US Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Under the
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9) – Defence of US
Agriculture and Food the DHS has been designated the lead agency in
ensuring that agriculture is protected. This directive compels the USDA, the
DHSS and the Environmental Protection Agency to work together to develop
preparedness plans.
The USDA has a broad mission statement to protect US agriculture from
pests and diseases and enabling food safety. In order to do this it operates
two lead agencies Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and
the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). Within APHIS there is a
veterinary department with duel responsibility to both diagnose and prepare
12
the country for a foreign animal disease outbreak. There is also a Plant
Protection and Quarantine department, which is charged with the monitoring
and detection of plant health issues. APHIS can put a Foreign Animal Disease
Diagnostician (FADD) anywhere in the US within 8 hours of a suspected
animal disease outbreak. In the case of plant disease this is 24 hours. These
Federal specialists make the final diagnosis but it is the individual state’s
responsibility to activate and enact a response plan and maintain quarantine.
The other two Federal agencies have broader roles in relation to ‘terrorism’
and as such may be seen to be more policy and guideline orientated – unless
there is an actual incident. The DHHS operates the Centre for Disease
Control (CDC) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The CDC
provides support to agriculture in terms of prevention and control strategies
whilst the FDA is involved in prevention strategies in the food sector – that is
all food (and cosmetics) apart from meat, poultry and eggs which are under
the USDA’s jurisdiction.
The third agency the DHS is the newest Federal agency established in 2002
and is directly involved in response planning to a terrorist attack. The DHS
has three primary missions;
• Prevent terrorist attacks within the US
• Reduce the US’s vulnerability to terrorism
• Minimise the damage from potential attacks and natural disasters
As the lead department the DHS operates a variety of strategies to combat
potential terrorism incidents from sniffer dogs at airports tasked to inspect and
intercept agricultural products at borders to the Emergency Preparedness and
Response Directorate which helps the nation respond and prevent a variety of
emergencies.
3.2 Chain of Response
Contrary to the dominant Hollywood image of emergency response the
Federal Government does not immediately step into a crisis, indeed since
Hurricane Katrina, States have worked greatly to assert their independence
and capability to address issues within their borders. To this end States adopt
the adage that ‘all emergencies are local’ and that the ability for first
responders to grasp and deal with the situation is paramount. Initially the
incident is dealt with at local level – which may be a county response. If the
incident is large or expands State resources will be mobilised. In the case of
agricultural incidents it is usual for a combination of the two to be initially
deployed. The State Emergency Management Agency can if needed declare
a State of Emergency which means that resources move from being ‘usual
and customary’ eg limited assistance to the local level to the mobilisation of
State resources – personnel, equipment, facilities etc. If the State’s resources
become stretched the 1984 Stafford Act can be invoked whereby a State can
request assistance from Federal sources, if the emergency results in
monetary loss of at least $1 per head of capita, mass casualties or great
threat to life or property.
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If the incident involves a foreign plant or animal disease the procedure is
slightly different. These pose a direct threat to US trade and therefore the US
Government becomes immediately involved. The US Secretary of State for
Agriculture can use Federal funds and if required can declare an ‘Incident of
National Significance’. If Zoonotic disease is involved, which may cause mass
casualties this response may be further escalated by the issuing of a
‘Presidential Disaster Declaration’ This ramping up of response not only
allows funds to flow but means animal and public health officials work
together under a joint incident command structure.
4.0 The State of Georgia’s Approach
The State of Georgia created the Georgia Agroterrorism Committee in 2003
as an extension of the State’s Homeland Security Taskforce. This committee
brings together the State’s statutory departments of agriculture, defence
human resources, transportation and the Georgia Emergency Management
Agency with APHIS, and the USDA. It also includes the University of Georgia
(various departments), the FBI and representatives from the Georgia Farm
Bureau, Georgia Poultry Federation and the State’s agribusiness council. The
committee works to evaluate risks, gather information and communicate
across the partners.
The State of Georgia sees education as being at the very core of making the
State’s agriculture safe and robust. At the core of dealing with this potential
risk is the need to communicate and disseminate the information and also the
requirement to have responsible disclosure. The Georgia OHS and agriculture
departments as the key organisations hold the ‘reins’ on information, deciding
what information is released and how it is to be used. They do this directly in
terms of ‘advice’ to key professionals veterinarians, law enforcement etc but
reach the wider community through involvement of Higher Education
Institutions (HEIs) in particular the University of Georgia (UoG) and the
development of a range of extension programmes. The principal aim of this
work is to promote early response, the pneumonic RAIN neatly summaries the
desired outcome of this work;
R- Recognise
A - Avoid
I - Isolate
N - Notify
Awareness education is seen as core to promoting preparedness and
protection within the state. Involvement of the HEIs is an interesting way of
promoting awareness, as the courses offered contribute to many rural
professionals Continuing Professional Development (CPD) and therefore
attendance and completion of courses counts towards career progression and
development. Courses offered at the University of Georgia include
‘Agrosecurity Awareness Training’ which includes modules on US agriculture,
the role of Federal Agencies, securing agriculture and food, food pathogens
and pests, emergency management and training specific to Georgia’s
14
agriculture. The courses are offered at a range of levels from the basic
awareness to those suitable for professionals such as veterinarians. Courses
can be built upon and range from a university certificate up to a Masters.
The University of Georgia sees the agroterrorism programme as fundamental
to empowering first responders to an incident. These first responders may not
just be veterinarians or state officials, but farmers, law enforcement officers
and medical staff. He sees the real challenge at raising awareness of basic
agricultural practices and diseases across a wide range of rural operating
individuals. Clearly there is recognition that information and training cannot be
solely focussed on practising agriculturists given the range of individuals
engaging with the rural environment. There is also a acknowledgement that
maintaining levels of awareness is an important facet of the programme. This
they do by combining the courses with key skills for rural workers such as
basic life support for animals and dealing with natural disasters. Support to
the rural communities to help them maintain their skill base is not just confined
to formal courses but is also available through e-mail updates, networking
events and on-line training, (Figure 1).
Figure 1 : University of Georgia training material
 and FBI Agroterrorism handbook
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4.1 University of Tennessee – Extension and Education in
Agroterrorism
The University of Tennessee runs a similar series of programmes relating to
agrosecurity including a preparedness level course on agroterrorism which
was the first to be certified by the DHS. The focus of this course is at the
community level. Unlike the UoG programme which very much focuses on the
individual business, the Tennessee programme views the rural economy as a
series of interdependencies in which various sectors have vested interest –
whether financial, physical or emotive. It utilises community level assessment
to assess vulnerability. The assessment is formalised through the use of the
Federal Government supported CARVER plus Shock methods.13
CARVER is an acronym for the following attributes used to evaluate the
attractiveness of a target for attack:
• Criticality - measure of public health and economic impacts of an attack
• Accessibility - ability to physically access and egress from target
• Recuperability - ability of system to recover from an attack
• Vulnerability - ease of accomplishing attack
• Effect - amount of direct loss from an attack as measured by loss in
production
• Recognisability - ease of identifying target
The Shock element is an assessment of the health, economic and
psychological impacts of an attack on the rural sector. This assessment is
fundamentally important as an agroterrorism attack may not just cause
economic damage but most certainly would cause social and emotional
damage to rural communities, which will require resources to mitigate against.
The advantage of using CARVER + Shock is that it is replicable. A
downloadable software tool ensures a common approach is made, and
although it can take time to get used to it produces a permanent record which
highlights areas of vulnerability within the system. Vulnerability is assessed by
scoring an agricultural or food production system in such terms as its
attractiveness to attack – eg icon food/  food for particular client), accessibility
to points of input, the sort of pathogens which could enter the system and
survive and how visible the process is – eg can access be gained without
detection. In short the process asks the respondent ‘could you introduce
material or adulteration at any stage of the process’.
5.0 Washington DC : Industry Vulnerability Assessment
CARVER + Shock was originally designed in the Second World War as an
offensive targeting programme which used criticality and accessibility to
determine targets. The USDA has turned this around to use it to assess
vulnerability. It has been seen very much as a tool for the larger sectors of
industry and as such it forms part of the Strategic Partnership Programme
Agroterrorism (SPPA)14 which is a DHS, FDA, FBI, and USDA entity.
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The use of CARVER + Shock started as a low level, inexpensive method of
identifying issues within a processing system. As a non-statutory, none
regulatory approach it was welcomed by the food industry and trade
associations as well as state and federal level partners. The USDA sees
CARVER + Shock as a key tool in identifying issues and producing
‘vulnerability roundups’ for generic processes and areas of industry. By doing
this it is clear that the food industry has accepted Agroterrorism as a term and
as a real risk to their business which is worthwhile investing in to
countermand. The results of individual enterprise surveys are classified and
so the output is removed from any Freedom of Information request – clearly a
concern for industry utilising commercial patented processes. Additionally the
information is not used to enforce legislation. These guarantees have ensured
the systems adoption by industry and its growing use.
Whilst CARVER + Shock has been rolled out across many sectors it clearly
has some limitations. Whilst accepting that agriculture is highly
interconnected, by concentrating on the large scale producers and suppliers it
may be that the smaller scale and in particular the hobby farmers are
overlooked, which may in the macro sense be the point of vulnerability.
CARVER + Shock also does not fully react to the potential for an insider to
cause damage or in labour intensive activities such as horticulture with large
changes in workers for mitigation to be effective.
5.1 Farm Level Advice
The American Farm Bureau (AFB) represents the majority of US farmers and
as such is a powerful and influential lobby group. The AFB unlike many of the
government agencies operates at grass roots level and has the potential to be
an accurate and efficient conduit of targeted information. However, it was felt
that this information may not have been flowing from Federal agencies clearly
enough, unlike with the food industry ,and as such a key part of the business
process wasn’t being kept informed. The AFB currently works alongside the
DHS, USDA and local law enforcement, however, some of this work may be
seen as too top down by recipients. The AFB has a valuable part to play in
outreach in particular to Hobby Farmers who may become associate
members. The AFB has a key role to play in promoting biosecurity, which they
estimate, in the commercial pig and poultry sectors to be very good but
variable in the smaller operators. Whilst these systems are economically
separated to a degree, geographically they may be very close. Good
communication is all about the focus of message. An effective response to a
crisis is assisted by sharing information, as well as help, and at is heart is
efficient organisation and community leadership.
6.0 Evaluation of System Approaches
The US has created a detailed and comprehensive response framework. It
clearly articulates procedure and due process and allows individual states to
adapt and develop responses. There is much to be positively acknowledged –
a clear recognition of the terms, an understanding of the threat and its
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incorporation into professional responsibility and concomitant training
development. However, much of this appears to serve either the food
processing industry, the food distribution network or the larger producers.
Given that the sector is so interdependent and geographically intermixed it
would appear that the threat does not necessarily lie exclusively with the
largest or most sophisticated organisation but the vulnerability lies as much as
with the weakest link. It was therefore surprising that so little of the heightened
awareness had ‘officially’ filtered down to farm level. Clearly by talking to FBA
members and local officials they had concerns and awareness but they were
often lacking in what they felt were the answers to their own questions. In
short some felt marginalised by the issue and powerless. For the small
producer CARVER + Shock may not be an appropriate system to adopt to
identify their vulnerability and plan a response.
In terms of law enforcement Agroterrorism is now a recognised form of attack
and as such the FBI has produced a Criminal Investigation Handbook for
Agroterrorism. This document clearly identifies not only the procedure for
investigating and partner organisations but also identifies measures for
dealing with the crime scene and collecting and collating evidence.
It would appear that the potential threat is being managed in some States
through a combination of risk management, law enforcement procedure and
sectorial knowledge sharing which has not given much opportunity for the
large numbers of potential individuals or businesses to be fully included.
Terrorism is a worrying fact of modern life. For many in rural areas it is a
distant thought, but post 9/11 for many it is a genuine fear but certainly not a
certainty. Being given the chance to be part of a system though is often the
key to turning a victim into a survivor and a survivor into a first responder.
7.0 The State of Florida - Integrated Disaster Management
Florida is a richly diverse agricultural state. Away from the beaches of the
Peninsula the northern and central areas are home to a large number of
varied enterprises from stock to fruit growing. Its geography and climate have
led to the development of an approach to rural disaster management which is
fairly unique in the US and into which the emerging threat of agroterrorism
has been incorporated. The Office of Agricultural Emergency Preparedness
(OAEP) which is in the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer
Services is based in Tallahassee, Florida. OAEP’s role is to provide a link
between the Federal agencies and the agricultural industry. It is also
responsible for analysing threats to the food industry at all levels including
transportation and distribution. Formally known as the Office of Bio and Food
Security Preparedness it changed its name in recognition of the wider variety
of CBRN agents now potentially available for use against the food sector. It
has close links to law enforcement and operates agricultural interdiction
stations on main highways in order to stop, search and investigate
movements of food and material into the state. As such it can effectively
monitor ‘imports’ into the state. Indeed the Florida agricultural commissioner
has the power to halt all movements of agricultural products into and out of
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the state. This second line of defence after APHIS is seen as an important
step in keeping Florida disease free.
As with other State emergency management systems the USDA would take
charge in the case of major incidents, however, the Florida system bases its
planning on a recognition of limited Federal capability to deal with multiple
incidents or outbreaks. The Florida State system is therefore very proactive in
promoting local responsiveness and raising awareness with local law
enforcement.
A key part of this system is the State Agricultural Response Team (SART).
Within the US there are a number of SARTs although there is no Federal
definition of what constitutes the role. Florida SART has a clear remit to tackle
both natural and man-made disasters. It emerged following Hurricane Andrew
in 1992 and currently it employs some 150 personnel in its animal division and
also has links to many volunteer and industry partners, (Figure 2).
Figure 2 : SART information poster
Originally SART had a focus on post disaster companion animal health but
subsequently encompassed agriculture and agriculturally related terrorism. It
also has a strong remit to provide animal related educational information to
the various sectors in the state. Until 9/11 its driving force was the hurricane
season, flooding and illegal immigration from Cuba bringing in disease.
Uniquely it also has to plan to incidents relating to the activities of NASA at
the Kennedy Space Centre.
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SART has close links to OEAP and DHS but has adopted a bottom up
approach focussing its efforts on counties building up to the state. In the event
of an outbreak this would complement the USDA’s Federal approach. What
this allows SART to do is have a clear organisational structure and to provide
a centre for emergency management, which allows clear messaging to its
communities. SART occupies one of the 18 Emergency Support Functions for
the state (No 17 being Animals and Agriculture) which allows it to take the
lead on incident control and make resource based decisions. For example
post hurricane Strike teams made up of forestry workers can be sent into rural
areas to open up highways and roads.
SART operates at both State and at county level. SART also takes on the role
of a multi-agency co-ordination group, which encompasses both public and
private associations, including public and private veterinarians, cattlemen
associations, the Florida Horse Association and veterinary volunteers (para-
veterinarians). Whilst State SART is a statutory organisation the county level
SART is a voluntary body whose creation is actively encouraged to assist
local citizens.
What SART has achieved is the creation of a community of rural individuals
who are prepared to act (and have acted following natural disasters) in order
not only to preserve their way of life but that of others. For example some
cattlemen have offered land for the quarantine of livestock while others have
volunteered to be spokespeople for the industry/ county. A key part of the
SART set up is the inclusion of volunteers. They bring to the table a number
of things. Firstly credibility within the wider community, they help with the
dissemination of key messages, they also bring core skills. Indeed in the case
of humane slaughter, the use of rural organisations/ local individuals can often
bring this element to a community. Indeed humane treatment of all post
disaster is a key element in promoting recovery.
The development of a large and diverse network does not happen over night
nor does it occur without management. SART uses exercise and conferences
to bring people together both individually and in-groups. Developing levels of
trust particularly between organisations is important.
In terms of tackling the threat from agro-terrorism the SART team recognise
there is a higher level of awareness of the issue within the agricultural leaders
(FBA, Cattlemen’s Association etc) than at the farm level. Raising awareness
and getting unusual incidents reported is seen as a key step in developing the
grass roots organisation to be more prepared. Indeed a key message of the
Florida disaster management system is promoting self-protection and self
help. A great deal of effort goes into assisting people in planning for
eventualities whether that be maintaining a reserve supply of generator fuel or
a quantity of animal medicines.
In contrast to much of what I had seen and been reported on in the US the
SART model seemed very much to be reflecting the needs of the community-
albeit being guided by State and Federal requirements. There clearly was a
20
long term strategy in place within the OAEP and SART with staff being
allowed to stay in roles in order to develop relationships with often disparate
and geographically isolated groups. Indeed for a government agency there
was real passion and commitment to the work, which was reflected by the
responses of the rural population who in turn reflected this with their
enthusiasm and commitment and most importantly involvement.
As SART moves more into agroterrorism and biosecurity training it is in an
ideal position to deliver key information direct to the community. Utilising key
leaders and informants already established in the system will allow them to
disseminate information with less chance of creating fear or scepticism and
place it firmly within the boundaries of measured and tempered fact. Indeed
the message has been re-focussed from one of anti-terrorism to protecting
ones self and business through implementation of agro-security measures.
Familiar words like biosecurity and farm security are more amenable to
populations and such advice offers real and tangible benefits.
7.1 Evaluation of SART
The SART model outwardly appears to tick many of the boxes in relation to
dealing with emerging issues. It has successfully galvanised many parts of the
rural community and promotes leadership, which would be a core requirement
in the event of a major disaster. However, the State of Florida is quite unusual
in its exposure to natural disasters and as such many of its residents are
disaster focussed and highly aware. For many of them to add to that list of
possibilities another issue may not be a major hurdle.
SART’s focus on the method of delivery through local contacts is re-enforced
by a series of conferences and presentations over the year. It is through these
the key message on biosecurity is delivered. The focus is very much at the
farm level – indeed the home, ranch and the field are considered
fundamental. Participants are asked to consider their own situation and the
emphasis is on practical actions and advice. Further emphasis is placed on
the individual to consider the creation of an action plan to deal with disasters –
man made and natural. Again guidance is offered on this through both
conference format and on the internet where work books, examples and self-
extracting presentations are offered. All this combines to empower the
community. They have ownership of the issue and can develop community
and individual responses to meet their needs within a framework.
8.0 Summary of Findings
The US Government’s stance on agroterrorism demonstrates a clear
recognition of this as an issue, which poses a threat to the US economy and
population. Whist agriculture may not be terrorists’ first choice it is certainly an
attractive secondary target15. Additionally the scope of possible perpetrators is
potentially larger than immediate concerns would indicate, and so planning
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has had to encompass the domestic terrorist, the lone perpetrator as well as
those with plans for extortion.
To respond to this the US has adopted a three pronged strategy for
countering the threat of agroterrorism;
• Deterrence and prevention
• Detection and response
• Recovery and management
All three of these areas have required investment in training and the
development of a flexible and motivated workforce at both Federal and State
level across many sectors.
The legislative and policy system established post 9/11 places a great deal of
emphasis on detection and monitoring of potential pathogens within the
environment. The involvement of the law enforcement and intelligence
community in the collection and detection of information regarding biological
weapons in particular which may be used to attack agriculture informs
preventative security methods and heightens industry awareness. To aid this
APHIS has now established offices in some 27-host countries to look for
intentional threats as well as unintentional contaminants in imports.
The role of law enforcement in the process is clear. Whilst agroterrorism
comes under the umbrella term of terrorism its special geographical and
economic characteristics have made it a sub-specialism with concomitant
development of procedures and training to meet the need.
To support these developments the US has created a number of centres of
excellence across the country including diagnostic laboratories for plant and
animal material, veterinarian research and food safety inspection. Speed of
diagnosis is seen as essential in order to first mobilise resources effectively in
order to counteract developing issues and secondly to clearly demonstrate
action to support the industry and maintain consumer confidence.
The US appears to suffer the same issues relating to biosecurity awareness
as other western economies. The industry is very much aware of the need to
maintain it and is indeed legislatively and commercially driven to maintain it.
However, like in the UK there is disparity in its full adoption across the sector.
This clearly has implications for the success of wider agroterrorism prevention
strategies.
Industry involvement in the preparedness planning process appears to be
variable beyond the large scale producers and processors. The food
processing and large scale agri-business sector are arguably easier to
engage with and account for the greatest proportion of income, jobs and
investment in the US agricultural sector. The engagement of this sector by the
Federal agencies has established the requirement for and practice of a
system based approach. However, the applicability of the CARVER + Shock
approach outside of these large-scale production systems is unclear.
22
CARVER + Shock works well within a regular processing framework but does
not reflect accurately the nuances of smaller scale agricultural systems. The
important field use of CARVER + Shock has come through its adoption by the
University of Tennessee’s Center for Agriculture and Food Security and
Preparedness. This approach brings CARVER + Shock into the community
and allows impacts and vulnerabilities within geographical areas not just
businesses to be established. Identifying vulnerabilities within the wider
industry is key to ensuring wider safety.
The use of HEIs to provide a range of education and information services is
widely accepted in the US. Most agricultural university faculties either offer an
extension service or are linked to the state’s extension service. Communities
often see them as providers of sound, impartial advice. Increasingly they are
offering DHS approved courses, which can lead to accreditation and
demonstration of core competency – particularly within the feed industry, law
enforcement and extension services. Whilst some of the courses are very
policy driven and equip the participant with regulatory and legal advice others
have a more practical focus. For example Tennessee offers a course totrain
‘First Responders’ which covers the following16;
This 4 day course will provide a participant with specific skills to
support a response to an agricultural disaster. It is a practical, hands on,
exercise based course. At the conclusion of the course, the participant
will be able to:
• Describe agroterrorism and its effects on humans, animals and the
economy
• Identify chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive
hazards and relate them to potential agroterrorism
• Demonstrate knowledge of agricultural-related epidemiology
• Identify zoonotic diseases that may be used by terrorists
• Identify foreign animal diseases that may be used by terrorists
• Describe response actions for an agroterrorism event, including the
role of the responder within the Incident Command System
• Describe various methods of animal restraint and euthanasia that
may be used in an agricultural incident
• Describe various methods of animal carcass disposal
• Demonstrate how to utilize personal protective equipment in an
agricultural incident
• Demonstrate how to perform decontamination procedures in an
agricultural response
• Demonstrate how to perform a post decontamination survey and
maintain crime scene preservation
By offering these courses to extension officers, students of agriculture, law
enforcement officers etc the ability of ‘the industry‘ to prepare is greatly
enhanced, as the population of informed and aware individuals is increased.
Crucially these courses are centrally funded and so participation is not limited
by affordability. Additionally by accrediting these courses within a credit
system, participants can enter into further educational experiences which can
enhance their learning.
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The community-based approach is most evident in Florida. Here
empowerment through structured training and the provision of a framework
within which to operate allows individuals to plan and train to meet their
unique needs. Whilst many in the UK would interpret this approach as an
abdication of authorities’ responsibilities, it would seem a rational approach to
create first responders rather than re-enforce traditional roles of victims and
rescuers.
Communication at farm level appears to be an issue (as in the UK). Any
preparedness plan is only as strong as its weakest link and farm level
communication regarding this issue appears patchy, and in some cases
overly technical. The use of technical language or large volumes of
documentation generally switch people off to the message and 12 page A4
documents about farm biosecurity whilst technically accurate cannot hope to
meet large audience requirements. Clearly its not the message but the form
which needs addressing.
It is within the Florida example any criticism of ‘government’ not
communicating effectively with the community can be seriously tackled. Whilst
most of the USDA type material and even some of the material produced by
extension services and HEIs can be cited as being policy driven and macro in
nature, SART is very much focussed at the small business. What is
particularly encouraging is the language, which is used which is clear concise
and meaningful within the small business context. It also does not involve any
unduly onerous surveys or special equipment and seeks to explain the
benefits of undertaking actions not just as a precaution against agroterrorism,
but also against natural disasters and general farm security.
9.0 Reflecting on The UK situation – Current UK Government policy
and planning
The UK does not have a formal agroterrorism policy to deal with the
contingency effects of a deliberate agroterrorist attack. Indeed the principal
authority for dealing with Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear
(CBRN) attacks/ events (under which agroterrorism falls) in the rural
environment DEFRA, has no mention of agroterrorism on its website.
Planning for a CBRN event is led through the Radioactive Substances
Division who are DEFRA’s lead agency for this area with the Government
Decontamination Service (GDS) providing information and advice in this area.
In terms of the collection of information and advice relating to animal health
and disease (Zoonotic and no-Zoonotic) a group of authorities (including the
Food Standards Agency, the Department of Health and the UK regional
executives for the UK) led by DEFRA co-ordinate this through their ‘Zoonoses’
report which is published periodically, the last being in 2004. Additionally
since FMD 2001 movement of livestock has been more closely controlled and
monitored largely through the employment of an Animal Health and Welfare
Strategy which operates a veterinary surveillance programme, which alerts
the state veterinary service to potential outbreaks of disease.
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The UK Government has a number of organisations dealing with terrorist and
emergency preparedness backed by legislation – the Civil Contingencies Act
(2004) which supports local and regional government’s action. The key
advisory body for the public is UK Resilience run by the Civil Contingencies
Secretariat again this organisation has no information directly relating to
agroterrorism. Only one document deals in detail with the rural situation,
which is a set of guidance for local government dealing with the
‘decontamination of open environment exposed to CBRN substances or
material. However, this does not relate directly to agriculture but to the urban
and rural environments in general and mostly details the responsibilities of
local government and other agencies in terms of decontamination, rather what
a landowner could or should be doing following an attack.
This type of advice is left to the document ‘Preparing for Emergencies’ a
booklet that was sent to all UK households post 9/11. This booklet advises the
population to ‘Go in, stay in and Tune in’. Whilst this may be appropriate
advice and for many in the population guidance they can follow, for
agriculturists, equine units etc this is not always practical as many livestock
managers will maintain their husbandry even under difficult conditions. Indeed
this document can be said to have rather an urban focus, reflecting the belief
that that is the key area of vulnerability.
The UK picture is one of much information regarding CRBN issues
disseminated amongst many organisations with very little focus and a general
non-recognition of agroterrorism as being a distinct threat. There is also
limited acknowledgement of the issues of dealing with geographically
disparate rural communities, many of which are economically tied to their
property more than a ‘normal’ householder. As a result of this broad grouping
of CRBN issues, there is no information available to farmers, landowners or
rural business advising them of risks or measures they could take to enhance
their business security. For example few are aware that they themselves are
liable to meet the costs of dealing with a CRBN incident on their land as noted
in the 2004 DEFRA publication - Strategic national guidance – the
decontamination of the open environment exposed to chemical, biological,
radiological or nuclear (CBRN) substances or material.
10.0 What Agents Could a Terrorist Employ in the UK Rural
Environment?
Within the realm of CBRN materials there are a number of agents whose
availability or ease of manufacture make them more likely materials of terrorist
choice. The UK’s agricultural system is still highly dependent on the use of
pesticides and insecticides, which are considered to be an effective
prophylactic against, introduced crop diseases. Therefore the use of a foreign
plant disease is unlikely. The UK climate is also a factor in limiting the impact
of foreign plant pest and diseases.
In 2004 the UK’s Department of the Environment Farming and Rural Affairs
(DEFRA) produced guidance for local authorities on the decontamination of the open
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rural environment following exposure to CBRN materials. Within this document a
number of materials were singled out as examples (Table 1), these provide a useful
insight into the range of potential agents under consideration and the importance of
recognising the persistence of these materials in the environment. This impacts on the
length of time the contamination is a risk and the degree to which de-contamination
can be employed (if at-all).
Table 1 : Rural CBRN Contamination
Type of Agent
Chemical Biological Radiological
Persistent
environmental
behaviour
Mustard or VX Anthrax Cobalt –60 or
Iridium-192
Non-Persistent
environmental
behaviour
Sarin or Cyanide Plague or Ricin N/A
Adapted from DEFRA 200417
10.1 Radiological Agents
The use of radioactive elements or compounds has often been dismissed as
being too difficult to obtain or construct. Whilst a nuclear device is a complex
weapon a ‘dirty bomb’ or Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) is a simple mix
of conventional explosive and radioactive material. Allan and Leitner (2006)18
argue that conventional wisdom would dictate that RDDs are best suited to
urban environments, which makes them ideal for use against rural
environments where surveillance is least.
Much discussion has centred on the availability of radiological materials.
Whilst it is often cited that material may be obtained from former Soviet
installations, however, domestic sources are far more easily obtainable from
hospitals, university research centres, construction and industrial sites. It is
often reported that these materials are ‘lost’ or stolen from facilities. Although
many of these sources are not useful for a RDD, thefts of material such as
Iridium-192 are of concern.
RDDs have a number of advantages over chemical and biological agents in
that radiation causes damage to all living tissue not just the target host.
The long-term effects on the human body and the potential for delayed illness,
particularly cancers may make this a more frightening incident for those in the
affected area. Furthermore, radiological contamination cannot be neutralised
or destroyed so contaminated material can only be removed and stored.
Contamination damages the very basis of the agricultural production as well
as damaging land values. Many radio-isotopes are soluble or easily absorbed
by plant and soil material. The Chernobyl legacy in North Wales clearly
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indicates the potential impact of an isotope entering the environment and
being re-cycled affecting both plant and animal communities with large scale
economic consequences.
10.2 Biological Agents
Biological agents figure highly in deployment potential. At the lowest level
there is contamination with biological agents such as salmonella and E-coli.
Such contamination is localised and may generally contaminate a single
property or enterprise. However, most of the potential agents are more likely
to be deployed with the aim of maximising the coverage of the impact. Whilst
the DEFRA review notes plague and ricin these are more likely to be resultant
from contamination from an urban incident ‘spilling’ over into the rural
hinterland. Of much greater concern are the Zoonotic diseases, in particular
Anthrax and Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (eg. H5N1). The former is
capable of being manufactured and the latter is present in wild bird
populations in Eastern Europe. Key pathogenic agents with the potential to be
deployed as anti-livestock and or anti-rural economy agents are outlined in
Table 2.
Table 2 : Key Pathogenic Agents
Disease Host(s) Zoonotic
Foot and mouth disease
(FMD)
Cloven footed domestic and wild
animals – cattle, sheep, pigs etc
X
Anthrax All warm blooded animals √
Brucellosis Mainly cattle, but also sheep, pigs,
dogs and goats
√
Highly pathogenic avian
influenza (HPAI) in particular
H5N1
Poultry and bird species √
Glanders Mainly horses Some strains can
affect people
Swine vesicular disease Pigs X
Rinderpest Cloven footed domestic and wild
animals – cattle, sheep, pigs etc
X
Newcastle disease Poultry X
Adapted from Centre for Disease Control19
Sourcing material presents similar problems to obtaining other agents. Many
of the pathogens are available in the environment, particularly in less
developed countries. Ungerer and Rogers (2006)20 explored the mechanism
of collecting and transporting the FMD virus. The concerning aspect of this
process is the simplicity of the operation and the ability of a perpetrator to visit
a number of farms to spread and cultivate the infection. Ungerer and Rodgers
also raise the spectre of the terrorist purchasing their own livestock to actively
culture the disease. Having a pool of infected beasts would allow outbreaks to
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occur in various locations (as in the UK’s experience of FMD in 2001)
resulting in a stretching of the response capability of authorities.
11.0 Risk and Vulnerability in the UK’s Agricultural Sector
The UK’s agriculture has a number of features, which heighten its vulnerability
to terrorist attack, these principally relate to its mode of operation, its
workforce and its and its openness. The main points of vulnerability are
considered to lie within the livestock and horticultural sectors.
The UK livestock sector agriculture is highly dependent on inputs, particularly
of feed. Studies by Kosel and Anderson (2004)21 have identified that this is
potential route for contamination. Livestock also are transported long
distances in the UK, for fattening or slaughter, again exacerbating the risk of
disease transfer. This route was clearly influential in the 2001 FMD outbreak
in the UK. During the FMD outbreak bio-security restrictions were imposed
nation-wide, with controlled entry to farms, and the widespread use of
disinfectant mats and wheel washes. In the subsequent years much of this
procedure has been eroded and vehicles move regularly between properties
with little or often no precautions. Poor biosecurity may also be exploited
through the many ‘hobby-farms’ in the UK. Outside of the normal agricultural
system, they potentially could become centres of unmonitored infection or
contamination. Other points of vulnerability stem from farm water systems,
boreholes, abstraction points, ring mains, reservoirs and header tanks are all
vulnerable to tampering, which could act as a conduit for disease or bacteria.
The September 200622 outbreak of E-coli in the US linked to contaminated
irrigation water although accidental illustrates how easy it would be for
deliberate contamination to take place, particularly of salad crops.
The changing nature of the labour force may also pose a risk. The UK rural
economy benefits greatly from migrant workers, many employed under
legitimate European union schemes. Most of the workers come with
references and provenance. However, agriculture and horticulture are often
seen as an ‘easy’ work environment for those entering illegally with no formal
papers. Not knowing the background of employees clearly poses a risk in any
business.
Finally, the openness of the British rural environment could also act as a point
of entry for terrorists, as well as the spread of any disease or the
dissemination of radiological contamination. Public footpaths and land
designated as open access land under the Countryside Rights of Way Act
(2000) offers large-scale unhindered access to land where livestock are kept
or water is sourced.
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12.0 Conclusions
From my study tour my ideas about this issue have shifted. At the outset my
view of preparedness was very much focussed on intervention policies eg
sending in first responders and dealing with the problem form there. Having
spoken with the practitioners and met members of the FBA and farming
communities I am more convinced about the need to train and develop grass
roots responders within a wider emergency planning type framework for that
initial response. The reason being these are the people who know the area
best, who know the practices, who can describe and collate information for
other agencies and fundamentally have an investment in the issue as its there
livelihoods. Clearly this is not a function for all members of a rural community
but rural leadership and community resilience is what very much sets apart
these communities from more fractured typically urban ones. The phrase
Community Resilience should not be over looked as mere buzzwords.
Communication has clearly taken place between the Federal Government and
the States and between the Federal agencies and the industry at large. By the
fact that agri-business has signed up to programmes such as CARVER +
Shock it is clear they recognise the threat to their business. All governments
do top-down better than bottom up – it’s the very nature of their bureaucracy
which is why the synthesis of the message as distributed through the States
via extension, HEI involvement, FBA and State agricultural services has been
effective.
Education has a key role to play, not just within the farming community but
those who work and live in it. Most importantly the role of the local law
enforcement officer is crucial, for they are the ones who are most likely to be
first notified of an incident or come across it in the execution of their duties.
The same could be said for the rural paramedic, doctor etc. Professionalising
courses relating to this topic and incorporating them within wider programmes
or career pathways ensures not only uptake but continuing development and
recognition of the dynamic nature of this area.
Biosecurity is clearly part of the preparedness plan – good biosecurity is
essential for a healthy system - which goes without saying. The incorporation
of biosecurity within the wider framework of agro-security is a convenient
method of exposing issues to a wider audience. Biosecurity is everyone’s
business in a rural community as is general security and effective messaging
is core to raising awareness.
12.1 Recommendations
There is every indication that agroterrorism presents a real and potential
threat to agricultural systems. Therefore in order to better prepare the
following are proposed based on experience within the US;
• Recognition of agroterrorism (in all its possible manifestations) as a
distinct threat to UK agriculture
• Wider promotion of biosecurity as the first line of defence
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• Production of a preparedness strategy which engages key sectors of the
industry with the aim of promoting deterrence, resilience and recovery
• Development of appropriate training packages for rural professionals, law
enforcement, businesses and communities.
• Greater promotion of rural emergency planning as a distinct entity
requiring particular engagement and management
• Promotion of rural business and community resilience planning
• Development of agro-security packages for the UK environment as a way
of businesses protecting themselves and their communities from
damaging external influences.
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